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Abstract	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ periphery	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ joined	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1998-ﾭ‐2000,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠprosperity,	 ﾠ
essentially	 ﾠdebt-ﾭ‐financed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrevealed	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ among	 ﾠ Spain’s	 ﾠ fiscally	 ﾠ
autonomous	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠwith	 ﾠde-ﾭ‐
leveraging	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠsterner	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠover	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgratitude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinput	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠJuha	 ﾠKilponen	 ﾠand	 ﾠFernando	 ﾠ
Guirao	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
participants	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIllinois	 ﾠconference	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠDebt	 ﾠCrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope’s	 ﾠPeriphery	 ﾠ
Economies.”	 ﾠResponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrest	 ﾠwith	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠamong	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ
periphery	 ﾠspread	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠto	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠto	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPeriphery	 ﾠ(SWEP	 ﾠhereafter).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
crises	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalready	 ﾠproving	 ﾠinadequate	 ﾠby	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
2011,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ Spain	 ﾠ stumbled	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ doubt	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ currency	 ﾠ
experiment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfail	 ﾠunder	 ﾠits	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠprocedures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
follow,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠremained	 ﾠintact	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠevents	 ﾠunfolded	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
2011,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyields	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠrose	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthose	 ﾠon	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠSovereign	 ﾠDebt	 ﾠYields,	 ﾠSWEP	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠOutlook,	 ﾠStatistical	 ﾠData	 ﾠBase.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ none	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ various	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐lasting	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Euro-ﾭ‐zone’s	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠunraveling	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
euro-ﾭ‐system	 ﾠafter	 ﾠit	 ﾠhad	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworking	 ﾠso	 ﾠwell	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1998?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠor	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2011?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhalcyon	 ﾠdays	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeleveraging	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstructive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠframing	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
questions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstructive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanticipating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprobable	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenhanced	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠoversights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠ agreed	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ December	 ﾠ 2011	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ confirmed	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ meeting	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
January	 ﾠ 30,	 ﾠ 2012.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ travails	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ alert	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
architects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠregime	 ﾠnow	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠto	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠin	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠeven	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
Below,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ explore	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ why	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐system	 ﾠ began	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pull	 ﾠ apart	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
September	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠrecovered	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠexploded	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠbubbles	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠrising	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐tradeables	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPeriphery	 ﾠ(SWEP)	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunintended	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ deleveraging	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ bubbles	 ﾠ burst.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Sovereign	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ
appeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠredress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheets	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐bonds	 ﾠall	 ﾠrose	 ﾠin	 ﾠprice	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠGreece,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠapparent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠhow	 ﾠits	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠflourished	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠten	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRegional	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠattenuated	 ﾠby	 ﾠlavish	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
credit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠventure	 ﾠa	 ﾠsober	 ﾠappraisal	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠprospects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
collapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐bond	 ﾠregime,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠnew	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠ
regime	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠeuro-ﾭbond	 ﾠregime	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ evident	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ retrospect	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sub-ﾭ‐prime	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
culminated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbankruptcy	 ﾠof	 ﾠLehman	 ﾠBrothers	 ﾠin	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
disruption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐system.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠyields	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠissued	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠall	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠin	 ﾠlockstep	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠGermany.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
period,	 ﾠall	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠdenominated	 ﾠin	 ﾠeuros	 ﾠwere	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠas	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠfor	 ﾠloans	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfterwards,	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure 2. SWEP bond yields compared to France and Germany, Jan. 2007 – Jan. 2012 
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠBloomberg.com/quote	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠ appeared	 ﾠa s 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠb o n d s 	 ﾠi s s u e d 	 ﾠb y 	 ﾠf i r s t 	 ﾠG r e e c e , 	 ﾠt h e n 	 ﾠI r e l a n d , 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠe v e n t u a l l y 	 ﾠ
Portugal	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsold	 ﾠat	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠdiscounts,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠyields	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ
bonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠweaknesses	 ﾠas	 ﾠevents	 ﾠ
unfolded	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠ interesting	 ﾠ phenomenon	 ﾠ appeared	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2009	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ yields	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ
sovereigns	 ﾠfell	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠreassured	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠpolicymakers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbold	 ﾠactions	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠhad	 ﾠde-ﾭ‐coupled	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtravails	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐American	 ﾠcousins.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠappears	 ﾠ
now,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠepisode	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠstage	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠde-ﾭ‐
leveraging	 ﾠby	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠand	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
beyond	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠswaps	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠelement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐prime	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠargument	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠ
bubble	 ﾠ went	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ long	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ US	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ convenient	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ “short”	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
residential	 ﾠmortgage	 ﾠbacked	 ﾠsecurities	 ﾠ(RMBS)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhallmark	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠto	 ﾠshort	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollateralized	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠ(CDOs)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠingeniously	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpackages	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRMBSs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindex	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
indicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠtranches	 ﾠof	 ﾠCDOs	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠswaps	 ﾠon	 ﾠCDOs	 ﾠto	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠ(Gorton,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠshort-ﾭ‐
sellers	 ﾠof	 ﾠRMBSs	 ﾠand	 ﾠCDOs	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠCDSs	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠderivative	 ﾠsecurities)	 ﾠ
profited	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠturned	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠCDSs	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
denominated	 ﾠin	 ﾠeuros.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPrices	 ﾠof	 ﾠCDSs	 ﾠon	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠthereafter	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
closely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyield	 ﾠspreads	 ﾠon	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(BBVA,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ collapse	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐bond	 ﾠ regime	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠbond	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠdeveloped.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdate,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ(February	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ
2012,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
investors).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpiecemeal	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠworse,	 ﾠas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere,	 ﾠ
yields	 ﾠof	 ﾠ5	 ﾠyear	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSWEP	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠyields	 ﾠon	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ
bonds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠEU	 ﾠauthorities,	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠyields	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfallen,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠ
before	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠrise	 ﾠagain	 ﾠas	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠrealize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfutility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
taken.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(A	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠtimeline	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠsince	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠweb	 ﾠsite:	 ﾠhttp://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html.)	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠResponses	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐bond	 ﾠyields	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠby	 ﾠEU	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
January	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
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Source:	 ﾠBloomberg.com/quote	 ﾠ&	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠTimeline	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠ
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html.)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ“behind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurve”	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠunfolded,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠprolonged	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐
zone.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ date,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ determination	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ meant	 ﾠ preserving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠeurozone	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠand	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfiscally	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠworking	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
National	 ﾠ Bureau	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Economic	 ﾠ Research	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ sifted	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSWEP	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠEvolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠCDS	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠeurozone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠ
non-ﾭeurozone	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ2005-ﾭ2011,	 ﾠquarterly	 ﾠaverages.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠAizenman,	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ40.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNote:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ South	 ﾠ Africa;	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Greece,	 ﾠ Panama;	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Ireland,	 ﾠ Malaysia;	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Italy,	 ﾠ Mexico;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
Portugal,	 ﾠColombia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	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 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠleading	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone,	 ﾠ regardless	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
counterpart	 ﾠ country,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 2008	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ worse	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ comparably	 ﾠ
indebted	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠprolonged.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
announced	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintended	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠrestoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠ below,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ
participants	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠdate	 ﾠwill	 ﾠever	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐bond	 ﾠ
regime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐prime	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspending	 ﾠbubbles	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
access	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHousing	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠdurables	 ﾠwere	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspending	 ﾠsplurges	 ﾠin	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠand	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠin	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠprojects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠremains	 ﾠsui	 ﾠ
generis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠIceland,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbest	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgigantic	 ﾠhedge	 ﾠfund	 ﾠrun	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
incompetents	 ﾠ (Lewis,	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ themes	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐system’s	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdecade,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠ
Bank	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐tradables	 ﾠ(service	 ﾠsector	 ﾠlabor,	 ﾠ
land,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhousing)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoorest	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠ
area	 ﾠ recalled	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Balassa-ﾭ‐Samuelson	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ economists	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 1960s	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ
developing	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ began	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ economies	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ joining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Bretton	 ﾠ Woods	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠof	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNeal	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠexplained:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalassa-ﾭ‐Samuelson	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
poor	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprice	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠare	 ﾠlow	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ trading	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ agricultural	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ manufacturing	 ﾠ
sectors,	 ﾠ protected	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ competition,	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ productive	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
advanced	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ wage	 ﾠ incomes	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ correspondingly	 ﾠ lower.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Much	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
economy’s	 ﾠ output	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐tradable	 ﾠ therefore.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠ barriers	 ﾠ protect	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
jobs	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ manufacturing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ agriculture	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ inherently	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
tradable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
money	 ﾠwages	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠ
Once	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ opens	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ advanced	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠ prices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ tradable	 ﾠ goods	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ backward	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ
quickly	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠworld	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalready	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
accession	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠeast	 ﾠand	 ﾠwest	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwages	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnow-ﾭ‐tradable	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwages	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
tradable	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrise	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠexpands	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠrise	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠ
trading	 ﾠpartners.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Neal,	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ304)	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠwere	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠ exchange	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ continued	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ appreciate	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ long	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ inflation	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ
continued	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ advanced	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ economies.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Neal	 ﾠ
concluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccession	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠen	 ﾠmasse	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2004	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
“well-ﾭ‐advised	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelay	 ﾠjoining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprice	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠare	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ394)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠobject	 ﾠlesson	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoorer	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠalready	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnow	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠat	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ apply	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ funds	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ whatever	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
projects	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ desired.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ proved	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ housing	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Ireland	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Spain,	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠGreece,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠin	 ﾠPortugal,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠin	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐tradable	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠor	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcase	 ﾠhas	 ﾠunique	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠprior	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠ
participated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠby	 ﾠindulging	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
housing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠprice	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperipheral	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠcontagion	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠspread	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Spain,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthat	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠSpain’s	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisparities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLessons	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠ
countries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠlessons	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠseven	 ﾠyears	 ﾠafter	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠTurkey,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry’s	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ
entry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐system,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoin.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠflexibility	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Central	 ﾠ Bank	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ loan	 ﾠ euros	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ
collateral	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountry’s	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠyields	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠten-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠissued	 ﾠby	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠconverged	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
outstanding	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠalready	 ﾠincurred	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠ
immediate	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠexpenses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠparties	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠin	 ﾠstating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ fiscal	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ structural	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ capital	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconverge	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMaastricht	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠof	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠ
long-ﾭ‐run	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ(taken	 ﾠas	 ﾠDebt/GDP	 ﾠof	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠand	 ﾠDeficit/GDP	 ﾠof	 ﾠ3%).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ arose	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ whose	 ﾠ
leaders	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ imperative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ meet	 ﾠ other,	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ before	 ﾠ
confronting	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(Neal,	 ﾠch.	 ﾠ5).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“ten	 ﾠgood	 ﾠyears”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠeurobond	 ﾠregime	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠfull	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠregional	 ﾠconflicts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠseparatist	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCatalan	 ﾠand	 ﾠBasque	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhappened	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
industries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhurt	 ﾠmost	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreal	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠappreciated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠso	 ﾠdid	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠalarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠimmigration,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠAmerica,	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ
labor	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ native	 ﾠ Spaniards	 ﾠ entered	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well,	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠforce	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠlow	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ48.0%	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
65.6%	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2007,	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ exactly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro.	 ﾠ
(Eurostat)	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠonly,	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠgrew	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠin	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠmanufacturing	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ high-ﾭ‐tech	 ﾠ sectors,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ productivity	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ stagnant	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠ 1999-ﾭ‐2007.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Meanwhile,	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ productivity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ grew	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠannual	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ0.5%	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠat	 ﾠ0.9%	 ﾠ(Eurostat).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
force	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐tradable	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠdiverting	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠareas	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠwas	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSources	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠJuan	 ﾠF.	 ﾠJimeno,	 ﾠed.,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSWEP	 ﾠProductivity	 ﾠLevels	 ﾠCompared,	 ﾠ2000-ﾭ2011.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠOECD,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠOutlook,	 ﾠNo.	 ﾠ90,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ badly	 ﾠ Spain	 ﾠ lagged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ productivity	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
comparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠslight	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠof	 ﾠstunning	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
unemployment.	 ﾠ
Meanwhile,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ meant	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ exchange	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ kept	 ﾠ
appreciating	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠreal	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠ
rate,	 ﾠ combined	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ lagging	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ productivity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ economy	 ﾠ put	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCapital	 ﾠimports	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠkept	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠequilibrated	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcame	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
increasing	 ﾠ indebtedness,	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government,	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ corporations,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
finally	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcountryside.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ7	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠindebtedness	 ﾠby	 ﾠsector	 ﾠas	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
extensive	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠnet	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
debts	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1999,	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠ
switched	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠupon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠsavings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠattractiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠdrew	 ﾠin	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠborrowed	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠhousing,	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ8.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ influx	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ combined	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ capital	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ signs	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Balassa-ﾭ‐Samuelson	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠwas	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠup	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠopen	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpartners	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ commitment	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ currency.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ After	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ brief	 ﾠ pause	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Spain’s	 ﾠ growing	 ﾠ
openness	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadjustments	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠright	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
end	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠ9).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSources	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠby	 ﾠsector	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠJuan	 ﾠF.	 ﾠJimeno,	 ﾠed.,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ8.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHousing	 ﾠBubble	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmounting	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble,	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ45	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ
savings	 ﾠand	 ﾠloan	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠ(Cajas	 ﾠde	 ﾠAhorros)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoastal	 ﾠregions	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
second,	 ﾠvacation	 ﾠhomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠand	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠhouseholds,	 ﾠmimicked	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠand	 ﾠloan	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠResolution	 ﾠTrust	 ﾠCorporation	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠand	 ﾠloan	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUS,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐backed	 ﾠFund	 ﾠfor	 ﾠOrdered	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Bank	 ﾠRestructuring	 ﾠto	 ﾠoversee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwinding	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐capitalized	 ﾠand	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐committed	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠOpenness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠEconomy,	 ﾠ1960-ﾭ2008.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcajas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠ45	 ﾠregional	 ﾠcajas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠ14	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlargest,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠde	 ﾠAhorros	 ﾠdel	 ﾠMediterráneo,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠover	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
injecting	 ﾠ€5.8bn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFund	 ﾠfor	 ﾠOrdered	 ﾠBank	 ﾠRestructuring	 ﾠ(FOBR).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠ
stress	 ﾠ tests	 ﾠ indicate	 ﾠ continued	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ loans	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ balance	 ﾠ sheets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐
organized	 ﾠand	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐capitalized	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
date	 ﾠare	 ﾠworking	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdid	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠResolution	 ﾠTrust	 ﾠCorporation	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠfull	 ﾠyears	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠwound	 ﾠup	 ﾠformal	 ﾠoperations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunwinding	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠ
took	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠmore	 ﾠyears	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Unique	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠ
Unlike	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Irish	 ﾠ case,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ did	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
liabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠ–	 ﾠSantander	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠBBVA	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠnot	 ﾠparty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠand	 ﾠunder	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
strengthen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠexpanding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠabroad,	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠAmerica.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠbank,	 ﾠCaixabank,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠretail	 ﾠbank	 ﾠ
created	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ absorb	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ activities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ largest	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ bank,	 ﾠ La	 ﾠ Caixa.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
consequence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠto	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠis	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
eurozone	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrisen	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ10	 ﾠshows,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
eurozone	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠG-ﾭ‐7	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠsave	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠlies	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ heavy	 ﾠ indebtedness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ households	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ nonfinancial	 ﾠ corporations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspending	 ﾠspree	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠdangerously	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠindebtedness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠdate	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠleverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠnow	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠsafe,	 ﾠas	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ peripheral	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ sum	 ﾠ up,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ
leeway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ10.	 ﾠDebt	 ﾠComparisons	 ﾠof	 ﾠG-ﾭ7	 ﾠand	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2012,	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠhow	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠcopy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreece,	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPortugal.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠSpain’s	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐run	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ
factor	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠnow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreached	 ﾠrough	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠprice	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐zone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠ analysts	 ﾠ agree	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ structural	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Spain’s	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ
markets,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠflexibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠhiring	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiring	 ﾠ
long-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ employees.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ minister	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ economy	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ competitiveness,	 ﾠ Luis	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ
Guindos,	 ﾠstated	 ﾠfirmly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠknew	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsee	 ﾠit	 ﾠthrough.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠwere:	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcentralized	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsectoral	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adjust	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ productivity;	 ﾠ 2)	 ﾠ simplify	 ﾠ full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠ contracts	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
encourage	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠhiring;	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐
value-ﾭ‐added	 ﾠsectors.”	 ﾠ(de	 ﾠGuindos,	 ﾠWall	 ﾠStreet	 ﾠJournal,	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ19,	 ﾠ2012)	 ﾠDe	 ﾠGuindos	 ﾠwent	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐capitalized	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ money	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ “the	 ﾠ entire	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠsector	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠrun	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ0.4%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
accrue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ60%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠEU	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠframework	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
reached	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU.”	 ﾠ(Ibid.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠanalysts	 ﾠ(other	 ﾠthan	 ﾠde	 ﾠGuindos)	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
increasingly	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ advanced	 ﾠ regions	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ Spain.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ relapse	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠlower	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠwas	 ﾠstunning	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠspeed	 ﾠand	 ﾠdepth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠall	 ﾠover	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠimmigrant	 ﾠlabor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconfront	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠtook	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ elections	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ 20,	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ compounded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ attempting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐run	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeleverage	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheets	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernments,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠand	 ﾠregional	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠare	 ﾠemblematic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
entire	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠnow	 ﾠunderway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠrightly,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠ
reforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠmoderated	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ reunification	 ﾠ shock	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 1990,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ worth	 ﾠ noting	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ took	 ﾠ nearly	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
accomplish.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠBanks	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegional	 ﾠHousing	 ﾠ
Just	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwell	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠgovernments,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regional,	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaftershocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Spain?	 ﾠ	 ﾠComparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
euro-ﾭ‐economies	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠappear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSpain’s	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠgood	 ﾠshape	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠliabilities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeposits,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠare	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠunsecured	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠ institutions,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ mutual	 ﾠ trust	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ sector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠwholesale	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcapital.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠshows	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparlous	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠowed	 ﾠover	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐fourth	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠwholesale	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠdepended	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
interbank	 ﾠsecured	 ﾠloans	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdeposits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠactually	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠin	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
shape	 ﾠthan	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠby	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCapital,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBVA	 ﾠ
table,	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠby	 ﾠnational	 ﾠauthorities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠComparative	 ﾠliability	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠBanks,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ
`European Banks Structure by country (BBVA, European Credit Markets: On Thin Ice, October 2011) 
    Due to other Financial Institutions  Wholesale Debt   













France  1932.5  107.3  378.7  6.0  174.1  743.7  3342.3 
Germany  3047.1  973.2  639.5  91.4  188.0  2090.1  7029.3 
Greece  1754.5  71.2  73.5  749.4  40.7  97.5  2786.8 
Ireland  182.2  152.5  16.5  47.9  13.4  83.9  496.4 
Italy  872.8  47.8  133.2  45.4  79.9  418.6  1597.7 
Luxembourg  70.6  2.9  11.4  10.0  6.1  36.3  137.3 
Netherlands  833.9  6.9  63.2  1.4  24.6  388.0  1318.0 
Portugal  176.9  26.8  21.7  4.2  9.9  42.6  282.1 
Spain  1251.5  90.4  124.6  43.3  12.2  422.6  1944.6 
United 
Kingdom  2662.3  391.8  346.4  24.7  139.2  841.5  4405.9 
  12784.3  1870.8  1808.7  1023.7  688.1  5164.8  23340.4 
               
France  57.8%  3.2%  11.3%  0.2%  5.2%  22.3%  100.0% 
Germany  43.3%  13.8%  9.1%  1.3%  2.7%  29.7%  100.0% 
Greece  63.0%  2.6%  2.6%  26.9%  1.5%  3.5%  100.0% 
Ireland  36.7%  30.7%  3.3%  9.6%  2.7%  16.9%  100.0% 
Italy  54.6%  3.0%  8.3%  2.8%  5.0%  26.2%  100.0% 
Luxembourg  51.4%  2.1%  8.3%  7.3%  4.4%  26.4%  100.0% 
Netherlands  63.3%  0.5%  4.8%  0.1%  1.9%  29.4%  100.0% 
Portugal  62.7%  9.5%  7.7%  1.5%  3.5%  15.1%  100.0% 
Spain  64.4%  4.6%  6.4%  2.2%  0.6%  21.7%  100.0% 
United 
Kingdom  60.4%  8.9%  7.9%  0.6%  3.2%  19.1%  100.0% 
               
	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBasel	 ﾠII	 ﾠAccords	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmark	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠany	 ﾠsecurities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ trading	 ﾠ accounts,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ assets	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bank’s	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠsheet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠintention	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠmaturity,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠat	 ﾠbook	 ﾠ
value,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠpar.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtroika	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠto	 ﾠoversee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠbailout	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠ
IMF,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠmission	 ﾠchiefs)	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGreece’s	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
marked	 ﾠdown	 ﾠ21%	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠtraded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠwould	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepo	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠat	 ﾠprices	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“haircut”	 ﾠ21%	 ﾠloss	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠit	 ﾠheld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuror	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nominal	 ﾠ stress	 ﾠ tests	 ﾠ performed	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ newly-ﾭ‐formed	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠBanking	 ﾠAuthority	 ﾠin	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠrevolved	 ﾠaround	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠamounted	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
guarantee	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
level.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠ trust	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ implicit	 ﾠ guarantee,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Banking	 ﾠ Authority	 ﾠ estimated	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ capital	 ﾠ
deficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ€2,5	 ﾠbillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠmore	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠfell	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRestructuring	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠBanks,	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ30,	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠFOBR	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ next	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ months,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Greece	 ﾠ worsened	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccessive	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠin	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠand	 ﾠPortugal,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
deficiencies	 ﾠ rose	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ €200	 ﾠ billion	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ swaps	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ
bonds,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠissues	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠprice	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠdid	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠconsolidation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtroubled	 ﾠcajas,	 ﾠinjecting	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
FOBR	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠand	 ﾠforcing	 ﾠmergers	 ﾠin	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠactions	 ﾠare	 ﾠsummarized	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(BBVA,	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRestructuring,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ€13.4	 ﾠbn	 ﾠin	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinjected	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠ€7.5	 ﾠbn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFOBR,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremainder	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠofferings.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmergers	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠand	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcajas	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠnew	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠas	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠ
banks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠstill	 ﾠremain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassets	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠmortgages	 ﾠon	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠ
developments,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠuncompleted	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠunoccupied.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠfast	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠfar	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
write-ﾭ‐downs	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade?	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠoutsiders	 ﾠare	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
wary,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠby	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvince	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠpick	 ﾠup	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠsummer	 ﾠvacation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠresidences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ July	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Ministerio	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ Fomento	 ﾠ prepared	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ evaluation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ housing	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠComparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ1996	 ﾠto	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐2011,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠhouse	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠappreciated	 ﾠless	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠor	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeak	 ﾠ(2007	 ﾠin	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Spain),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠhas	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠprices	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
comparable	 ﾠto	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ8	 ﾠabove).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
optimistic	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ85%	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠis	 ﾠowner	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠ33%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠstock	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
vacation	 ﾠhouses)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠrent	 ﾠto	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠhouse	 ﾠprice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
pre-ﾭ‐bubble	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsum,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠso	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠto	 ﾠpick	 ﾠup	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠvacation	 ﾠhome	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠConsolidation	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcajas	 ﾠ	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregional	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdeclines,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ





Cajas	 ﾠconsolidated	 ﾠ Capital	 ﾠ
(Eur	 ﾠmn)	 ﾠ
Galicia	 ﾠ <15%	 ﾠ NovaCaixaGalicia	 ﾠ(Caixa	 ﾠGalicia,	 ﾠCaixanova)	 ﾠ 76,117	 ﾠ
Asturias	 ﾠ <15%	 ﾠ Liberbank	 ﾠ(CCM,	 ﾠCajastur,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠCantabria,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠ
Extremadura)	 ﾠ
52,451	 ﾠ
Basque	 ﾠCountry	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐16.3%	 ﾠ Kutxa	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(BBK,	 ﾠCajasur,	 ﾠKutxa,	 ﾠVital)	 ﾠ 74,242	 ﾠ
Navarra	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐16.9%	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐16.7%	 ﾠ
Banca	 ﾠCívica	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Cajasol,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠNavarra,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠCanarias,	 ﾠ
Caja	 ﾠMunicipal	 ﾠBurgos)	 ﾠ
71,566	 ﾠ
Aragón	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐16%	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐19.2%	 ﾠ
Banco	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(CAI,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠCírculo	 ﾠde	 ﾠBurgos,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠ
Badajoz)	 ﾠ
20,563	 ﾠ
Catalonia	 ﾠ <15%	 ﾠ Catalunya	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠ(Caixa	 ﾠCatalunya,	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠTarragona,	 ﾠ
Caixa	 ﾠManresa)	 ﾠ
76,380	 ﾠ
Catalonia	 ﾠ <15%	 ﾠ Caixa	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(La	 ﾠCaixa,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠGirona)	 ﾠ 273,387	 ﾠ
Catalonia	 ﾠ <15%	 ﾠ UNNIM	 ﾠ(CAM,	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠSabadell,	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠTerrasa,	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠ
Manlleu)	 ﾠ
100,231	 ﾠ









Unicaja	 ﾠ+	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠEspaña	 ﾠDuero	 ﾠ(Unicaja,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠJaén,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠ
Duero,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠEspaña)	 ﾠ
79,355	 ﾠ
Madrid	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐21.5%	 ﾠ Bankia	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Caja	 ﾠMadrid,	 ﾠBancaja,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠInsular	 ﾠde	 ﾠAhorros	 ﾠ
de	 ﾠCanarias,	 ﾠCaixa	 ﾠLaietana,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠÁvila,	 ﾠCaja	 ﾠSegovia,	 ﾠ
Caja	 ﾠRioja)	 ﾠ
285,479	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Ibercaja	 ﾠ 44,906	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Caixa	 ﾠOntinyent	 ﾠ 980	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Caixa	 ﾠPollença	 ﾠ 344	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠBBVA,	 ﾠ“Roadmap	 ﾠto	 ﾠRestructuring”	 ﾠand	 ﾠupdates.	 ﾠ
Modifying	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠrestructuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ
cajas,	 ﾠw h i c h 	 ﾠf i n a n c e d 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠh o u s i n g 	 ﾠb u b b l e , 	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠr e g i o n a l 	 ﾠd i s p a r i t y 	 ﾠi n 	 ﾠp r i c e 	 ﾠd e c l i n e s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠ
housing	 ﾠacross	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbubble	 ﾠcollapsed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠall	 ﾠregions	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
housing	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwere	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠhard	 ﾠhit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcoastal	 ﾠprovinces	 ﾠof	 ﾠAlicante,	 ﾠMurcia	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠMálaga	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠMadrid	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠprovinces	 ﾠof	 ﾠToledo	 ﾠand	 ﾠGuadalajara	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ20	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠyears	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠquarter	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠquarter	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠregional	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregional	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrestructuring	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFOBR,	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ
Clearly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠrestructurings	 ﾠof	 ﾠregional	 ﾠcajas	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠdate	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠ
authorities	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠdeclines	 ﾠin	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠprices	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠled	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmortgages	 ﾠheld,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“marked	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmarket”	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠunder	 ﾠBasel	 ﾠII	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsecurities	 ﾠheld	 ﾠon	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmortgages	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmortgaged,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠdown	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠacquire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠare	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠhesitant	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠviability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
banks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmortgages	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠstock	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdropped	 ﾠpermanently.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRecovery	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ probably	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ depend	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ buying	 ﾠ spree	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ foreigners,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Spain	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ shot	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ dramatically	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ severely	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ younger	 ﾠ
workers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhome	 ﾠbuyers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠEurostat	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSpain’s	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠunder	 ﾠage	 ﾠ25	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ46.2%,	 ﾠby	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
highest	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠregional	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregional	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠregional	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠrun	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
deficits,	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠregional	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠincurred	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdoubled.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠ exercise	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ budgets	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ “Budgetary	 ﾠ Stability	 ﾠ Law,”	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠannual	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠan	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
exceeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠdeficit,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“Economic	 ﾠand	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRebalancing	 ﾠPlan”	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ recover	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deficits.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ meantime,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ differences	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ
administration	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠare	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
deficits	 ﾠcumulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠamounted	 ﾠto	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠ€25	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠ
back	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠin	 ﾠ60	 ﾠinstallments	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ(BBVA,	 ﾠThin	 ﾠ
Ice,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ56)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregions	 ﾠamounted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.2%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠcuts	 ﾠand	 ﾠtax	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠaggressive	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCastile-ﾭ‐La	 ﾠMancha	 ﾠ
cut	 ﾠits	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠby	 ﾠ20%	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠregions	 ﾠ—	 ﾠExtremadura,	 ﾠValencia,	 ﾠCanary	 ﾠIslands	 ﾠ—
followed	 ﾠits	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠBBVA	 ﾠresearchers	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
deficit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠ2%.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠregions	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠratings	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
downgraded	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠoutlooks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach.	 ﾠ(BBVA,	 ﾠThin	 ﾠice,	 ﾠ
p.	 ﾠ54)	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠplanned	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ6%	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
exceeded,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠpress	 ﾠreports	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ(FT,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ13,	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
administration	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠin	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ8.2%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ
(FT,	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ16,	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdowngraded	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠrating	 ﾠ
agencies,	 ﾠMoody’s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ13,	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠA3	 ﾠto	 ﾠA1,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsale	 ﾠof	 ﾠ€4bn	 ﾠ
Spanish	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠlater	 ﾠthat	 ﾠweek	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhailed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“revived	 ﾠinvestor	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠreform	 ﾠprogramme.”	 ﾠ(Ibid.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠa	 ﾠthree-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠbond	 ﾠsold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠyield	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ2.97	 ﾠper	 ﾠcent,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ2	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ4.9	 ﾠper	 ﾠcent	 ﾠyield	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ
sold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠthree	 ﾠyears	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠfirmer	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠintended	 ﾠor	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠupon	 ﾠby	 ﾠheads	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro-ﾭ‐
zone	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbode	 ﾠwell	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fiscal	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnear	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappear	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsalutary	 ﾠto	 ﾠcraft	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeventual	 ﾠGreek	 ﾠdefault,	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠfull	 ﾠpublicity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resulting	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ outrage	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Greece	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ follows,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trust	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwill	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
fate	 ﾠas	 ﾠGreece.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ longer	 ﾠ run	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ case,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ few	 ﾠ optimists	 ﾠ remaining	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Spain	 ﾠ
(national	 ﾠstereotypes	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvalidity)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠaspects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspending	 ﾠspree	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ10	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecond-ﾭ‐
homes	 ﾠand	 ﾠseaside	 ﾠresorts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠaveraged	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ28%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ 2000-ﾭ‐2007,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ highest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ euro-ﾭ‐zone	 ﾠ country.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Housing	 ﾠ investment	 ﾠ
accounted	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ 8%	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ GDP,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ 20%	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
motorways,	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐speed	 ﾠrail,	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠport	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠairports	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠopen	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ(Spain’s	 ﾠ
Equity	 ﾠStory,	 ﾠpp.8-ﾭ‐20).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpain’s	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐economy	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠas	 ﾠearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠ1960	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Franco	 ﾠ regime,	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ expand,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Latin	 ﾠ America,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠembarked	 ﾠon	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐economy	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ finances,	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ structure,	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ
restrictions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpension	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠare	 ﾠwell	 ﾠunderway,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠderegulation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠmost	 ﾠtightly	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
sector	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Europe,	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ Greece	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Italy.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ least	 ﾠt i g h t l y 	 ﾠ
regulated	 ﾠservice	 ﾠsector	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠtrailing	 ﾠonly	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Spain’s	 ﾠ
Equity	 ﾠ Story,	 ﾠ p.	 ﾠ 66)	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ entrepreneurial	 ﾠ
investments	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ financing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ ventures,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠpath	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinterrupted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠadvances	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsustain	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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